The Data Behind the Crisis: What 541 Annual Reports Reveal

Yesterday we asked whether management teams tell you the truth when crisis hits. We examined how Woodside disclosed geopolitical risk before the Hormuz crisis, how Air New Zealand and Qantas responded differently to the same fuel shock, and how Singapore Airlines’ buyback timing raised questions about stress-testing.

Today we go deeper into the data.

The Q Factor tracks specific commitments from annual reports across 590+ companies on the US, ASX, SGX and NZX. Revenue targets, capital allocation promises, hedging strategies, expansion timelines — every commitment recorded, every delivery measured. We call this Say/Do tracking, and the Hormuz crisis is the most concentrated test of that data we have observed.

What follows is not a macro forecast or a trade recommendation. It is a sector-by-sector examination of what management teams promised in stable conditions and what the disruption reveals about those promises.

Santos: When Delayed Execution Meets Perfect Timing

Santos (ASX: STO) shipped its first Barossa LNG cargo in January 2026. That milestone matters because Barossa was repeatedly delayed. Environmental approvals, regulatory challenges, and technical setbacks pushed the project well beyond its original timeline. For years, the commitment to deliver first gas was a Say/Do liability — a promise that kept slipping.

Then the Hormuz crisis arrived, and Santos found itself entering a rising production environment precisely as global LNG supply contracted. QatarEnergy, the world’s largest LNG exporter, declared force majeure on all gas contracts after Iranian drone strikes hit Qatari facilities on 2 March. Approximately 77 million tonnes of annual LNG capacity went offline. Asian buyers who had relied on Qatari gas through the Strait of Hormuz began scrambling for alternative supply.

Australian LNG sits one week’s shipping time from key Asian buyers, compared with two or more weeks from the Middle East. Santos’ management has guided for 25 to 30 per cent production growth by 2027 as both Barossa and the Pikka project in Alaska ramp up. Free cash flow in FY2025 was US$1.8 billion, with a breakeven below US$30 per barrel — which means even a partial Hormuz disruption lands well above their cost floor.

The credibility question is how management frames this convergence. There is a material difference between a management team that says “we delivered Barossa and the market rewarded us” and one that says “we delivered Barossa, and the timing of the Hormuz crisis created favourable pricing conditions that are external to our execution.” The first is narrative management. The second is accountability.

We will be reading the next annual report for precisely this distinction. Management teams that conflate external tailwinds with operational delivery tend to score lower on credibility over time, because the same conflation works in reverse when conditions deteriorate.

Viva Energy: The Widest Divergence in Our Database

Viva Energy (ASX: VEA) presents a case study in what happens when a company’s qualitative and quantitative signals tell different stories.

Our database tracks 41 commitments for Viva Energy. The qualitative score is 84 out of 100 — among the highest in our ASX coverage. Management communicates with clarity, provides forward-looking context, and maintains a consistent strategic narrative across reports. The quantitative score, however, is 30. The financial metrics have not followed the story management has been telling.

That 54-point gap is the widest in our entire coverage universe of 590+ companies. In our methodology, when the qualitative score exceeds the quantitative by more than 15 points, we flag it as a divergence — a signal that either the numbers will eventually catch up with a genuinely improving business, or that management is better at communicating than executing.

The Hormuz crisis is testing which interpretation applies.

Viva Energy operates the Geelong refinery, which processes around 120,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Australia depends on imported crude for virtually all of its refining. When crude supply is disrupted, downstream refiners face a margin squeeze — unless they can pass through higher costs to customers.

The early signals are mixed. The crack spread, which is the refinery margin between crude and refined fuel, has widened from approximately US$22 before the conflict to as high as US$115. For a refiner, a wider crack spread can mean higher margins if crude supply is maintained. But if physical crude deliveries to Geelong are disrupted or delayed, the refinery operates below capacity regardless of what margins look like on paper.

This is exactly the scenario Say/Do tracking was designed for. We have recorded what Viva Energy’s management said about supply resilience, fuel security, and margin targets when oil was trading at US$65 to 70. The next report will reveal whether those commitments hold at US$100 or above. If the quantitative score improves materially, the qualitative signal was prescient. If it does not, the divergence was noise dressed up as narrative.

Mainfreight: The CEO Who Said It Plainly

On 5 March 2026, Mainfreight (NZX: MFT) managing director Don Braid went on RNZ’s Morning Report and told New Zealand what to expect. His message was direct: prices for “anything attached to fuel” will rise. Petrol, diesel, freight, international travel. He described the situation matter-of-factly, noting it was “just a part of every day life in logistics” and that while New Zealand and Australian exporters could reroute across Asia or the United States, the disruption adds cost and transit time.

No corporate hedging language. No waiting for conditions to stabilise before acknowledging reality. Just plain information delivered to the public ahead of the impact.

Our database tracks 43 commitments for Mainfreight across five years of annual reports. Management credibility score: 70 out of 100. The company has ambitious growth targets — branch expansion from 319 towards 500, a $676 million capital expenditure programme, and a $4 billion revenue target. Of 40 tracked commitments with outcomes, 16 have been delivered, 23 are partial, and 1 has been missed.

The credibility profile shows a notable divergence: qualitative score of 78 versus quantitative score of 55, a 23-point gap. Like Viva Energy, this flags a pattern where management communicates well and strategises clearly, but financial delivery has not fully matched. However, the nature of the divergence is different. Mainfreight’s partials are concentrated in expansion timeline commitments — targets that are directionally correct but running behind schedule. That is a different credibility signal from missed revenue guidance or abandoned strategic initiatives.

Braid’s public candour during the Hormuz crisis is consistent with the qualitative signal our data captures. Management teams that communicate honestly in annual reports tend to communicate honestly in disruption. The pattern holds across our coverage universe: companies with credibility scores above 70 are disproportionately represented among those that have communicated proactively since the crisis began.

The question for Mainfreight is whether the cost pass-through mechanism works. Fuel is a direct input cost for a logistics company. If Mainfreight can pass through higher fuel costs to customers without material volume loss, the quantitative score should hold or improve. If customers defer shipments or switch to cheaper alternatives, the annual report commitments on revenue targets become more difficult to meet. Don Braid was honest about the exposure. The financials will show whether the business can absorb it.

SGX REITs: The Refinancing Test Nobody Discussed

Singapore-listed REITs occupy a position that receives less attention in the Hormuz crisis narrative, but may be among the most consequential for long-term investors.

REITs are not in the oil supply chain. Their exposure is indirect but real: if bond markets reprice on inflation expectations driven by sustained elevated energy costs, refinancing becomes more expensive. For trusts with significant debt maturities in the next 12 to 24 months, the gap between what management guided for and what the market now demands could widen materially.

Our SGX REIT coverage includes trusts that provided specific guidance in their latest annual reports on weighted average debt maturity, hedging ratios, and interest coverage ratios (ICR). These are concrete, measurable commitments — precisely the kind of data Say/Do tracking captures.

The pattern we have observed historically across our database is revealing. When a metric becomes difficult to hit, weaker management teams simply stop mentioning it. The next report discusses occupancy rates, tenant profiles, and development pipelines in detail but the refinancing cost guidance from the prior annual report is absent. No revision, no explanation, no acknowledgement. Just silence.

Stronger management teams address the gap directly. They disclose the new borrowing cost environment, explain how it differs from prior guidance, and describe what mitigation they are pursuing. Some trusts in our coverage have ICR above 3.5 times, which provides a genuine buffer against rate movements. Others are closer to the covenant threshold. The annual reports from these trusts made specific claims about their debt management strategy. The Hormuz crisis, through its inflation and rate transmission effects, is now testing whether those claims were conservative enough.

This is the quiet end of the crisis. No dramatic share price spikes, no daily headlines. Just a slow repricing that will eventually surface in interim reports — and the credibility data will update accordingly.

The Broader Pattern

Across our coverage universe, three categories are emerging from this crisis.

Companies that prepared. These are the businesses whose annual reports contained specific, quantified risk disclosures for supply disruption scenarios. Their hedging was in place. Their guidance incorporated price sensitivity ranges. When the crisis hit, shareholders already had the information they needed to assess their exposure. As we covered yesterday, Woodside is the clearest example on the ASX.

Companies that adapted. These are the businesses that may not have specifically modelled a Hormuz closure, but responded promptly when conditions changed. Air New Zealand, which we covered in detail yesterday, withdrew guidance within days because the operating assumptions no longer held. Don Braid at Mainfreight communicated publicly before the cost impact reached consumers. These are management teams that prioritise accuracy over optimism.

Companies that went quiet. These are the businesses where forward guidance from February filings remains technically live despite the operating environment having fundamentally shifted. When a company does not update guidance after a material change, one of two things is true: either the disruption genuinely does not affect them, or they are hoping nobody notices. We flag the second scenario as silently dropped guidance, and it is one of the most telling signals in our analysis framework.

We are tracking all three categories across 590+ companies. The data will update as interim reports are published in the coming months. The companies that score highest on management credibility through this period will be the ones that told shareholders the truth — before, during, and after the crisis — regardless of whether that truth was comfortable.

Browse company Q Scores for free at theqfactor.io. Full analysis reports are available per credit.

This market review is part of The Q Factor’s analysis series. Analysis is based on publicly available data from company annual reports, exchange filings, and our proprietary Say/Do tracking database covering 590+ companies. This is not financial advice. The Q Factor does not predict stock prices or recommend trades. Every investor’s circumstances are different. Past patterns may not predict future performance. Always conduct your own research before making investment decisions.